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University, 31 March 2010. 
 
1. Privacy has been in the news again. Alison Mau made complaints on the 
tele that she was being stalked by media. (this was denied). This story 
involves aspects of spying, or surveillance, and so it is timely to discuss 
some recommendations made by the Law Commission in its on-going 
investigation into our laws of privacy (Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and 
Remedies (Report 113, January 2010). 
2. The issues around the Alison Mau complaint were much  blogged about, 
such as: 
a. Do celebrities who live by the media have a right to complain when 
they object to what is being published? (yes, I think even 
celebrities are entitled to a private life, at least in relation to any 
area they have kept out of the public eye); 
b. Is there public interest in the sexual orientation of celebrity 
newsreaders? (It’s highly unlikely, though lots of people may be 
prepared to buy the Herald to read about it): 
c. Should Mau have complained on breakfast television about the 
situation and used the opportunity to ask viewers to contact an 
editor of a womens’ magazine to complain? (it does seem rather 
incongruous that she did this on the segment of the programme 
which happily delves into womens’ magazines every week), and I do 
have some concern about use of the broadcast opportunity to solicit 
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negative responses and direct them to an actual email address –  
however, this does not apparently breach the BSA privacy principle 
4 which provides: 
 The protection of privacy includes the protection against the disclosure by the 
broadcaster, without consent, of the name and/or address and/or telephone 
number of an identifiable individual, in circumstances where the disclosure is highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person.  
The BSA has held in TV Works Ltd and Kirk [2007] that the 
disclosure of an e-mail address did not result in the type of 
mischief that Principle 4 is designed to address. It is aimed at 
preventing ‘potential harassment or physical threats at a place of 
residence’. Nicole Moreham has suggested this is right because 
unwanted e-mails can be easily deleted and e-mail addresses can 
easily be changed.  However, I wonder about that. Business email 
addresses are less easy to change and the possibility of an invited 
spamming campaign might be a form of harassment which should be 
prevented. Moreham has suggested that disclosure of an e-mail 
address could still be a breach of BSA Principle 1 , which provides:  
1. It is inconsistent with an individual’s privacy to allow the public 
disclosure of private facts, where the disclosure is highly offensive 
to an objective reasonable person.  
and I agree with her.   
d. Should TVNZ have weighed into the mix with coverage on Closeup? 
(State broadcaster, etc, but since it is expected to operate on 
commercial principles along with private media, it is entitled to call 
this stuff news, whatever ulterior motive there might be.) 
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3. However, the main issue for Mau was the fact that she felt she and her 
family were being stalked. So what can anybody, including celebrities, do 
about persistent media methods that border on stalking? The answer is 
maybe: 
i. The tort of privacy is of little use unless the stalking produces 
information which is then published. In New Zealand, you need to 
show you had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information published, and publication is highly offensive to an 
objective reasonable person. The defendant has a defence if they 
can show there is public interest in the information. So the tort 
only covers what we call informational privacy at present. It does 
not apply, currently, to the manner in which information is 
obtained, although it might be argued that the tort should be 
extended in this way. The problem with stalking is that much of it 
occurs in public, and the presumption in the tort is that you do not 
have an expectation of privacy in relation to events which occur in 
public. However, there are indications in overseas cases that 
activities occurring in public can be the subject of the tort – the 
Murray case involving the author JK Rowling and her family walking 
on a public street, and the Von Hannover case, involving a 
successful claim by Princess Caroline of Monaco for photographs of 
family activities carried on in public.  
The fact remains, however, that really, you would have to argue for 
a separate tort covering interferences with aspects of your 
physical autonomy – effectively a right to be let alone. Here it 
might be useful to look to the BSA. 
ii. What about the BSA? The BSA has a privacy principle which 
states: 
3. (a) It is inconsistent with an individual’s privacy to allow the public disclosure of 
material obtained by intentionally interfering, in the nature of prying, with that 
individual’s interest in solitude or seclusion. The intrusion must be highly offensive 
to an objective reasonable person.  
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How does this work?  ‘Solitude’ has been defined as ‘the state of 
being alone’ and in fact has not been satisfied in any of the 
complaints so far. But seclusion can cover more possibilities.  You 
have an interest in ‘seclusion’ if you are in a ‘state of screening or 
shutting off from outside access or public view’, because you have 
created ‘a zone of sensory or physical privacy’.  And you can do this 
even if you are not absolutely on your own.   Once you have 
established an interest in solitude or seclusion you have to show it 
has been interfered with. It will almost always be an interference 
with solitude or seclusion to broadcast footage obtained with a 
hidden camera or even when you are filmed quite overtly. 
There are still difficulties applying Principle 3 to intrusions in a 
publicly accessible place.  In all the cases where Principle 3 has 
been breached, the footage was obtained either by filming a person 
on private property or by filming the property itself.  For example, 
seclusion can exist when you are opening your front door or when 
inside your own house or car, or on your farm property, and this can 
apply even if you are not present on the land in question. However, 
seclusion does not cover activities on a public waterway, or to 
someone conducting his work in a public place with unrestricted 
access. 
Moreham argues it is too simplistic to use this approach.   Being in 
public may mean you can be seen only by a handful of people who 
happen also to be in the vicinity.  Furthermore, to interpret the 
Principle in this way means there is almost no protection to those 
without access to private property, such as ‘homeless men living 
under a bridge in central Auckland, even against broadcast of 
footage obtained by continual unwanted surveillance by an 
overzealous reporter’.  And some workers spend the bulk of their 
working lives in public. Therefore, Moreham has suggested that the 
Principle could be extended to cover your interest in solitude or 
seclusion or your private affairs or concerns, as in one form of the 
tort in the US. This might then cover forms of media stalking, 
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remembering that intrusion still has to be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person. 
Of course, such a principle could only apply to broadcast, not print 
media, at present, since the BSA has no jurisdiction over magazines 
or print media. However, the tort could be extended to these 
situations too. 
iii. What about the criminal law?  We have a Harassment Act and 
criminal offences which cover some spying activities. But there are 
gaps. 
i. Obviously if media commit an illegal act while persistently 
following someone, or hang around watching them, they can 
be criminally liable. The most obvious offences are trespass, 
and wilful damage. If you secretly film someone engaged in 
intimate activities, you may be guilty of intimate covert 
filming offences. If you are peeping or peering into a 
dwellinghouse at night without reasonable excuse, you can be 
fined $500.  The Law Commission has recommended that this 
offence be broadened to cover voyeuristic behaviour, and 
should not be limited to night time.  
ii. However, it is no offence to use a device for visual 
surveillance. The Law Commission has recommended a new 
offence of intentionally installing a visual surveillance device 
or interception device on private land or premises, where 
trespass is used. Law enforcement agencies exercising valid 
powers would be exempt. The Commission has also 
recommended an offence of using a visual surveillance device 
to observe or record the activities in a dwelling, without 
consent. This is not limited to surveillance of intimate acts. 
For this, defences would be available to others as well as law 
enforcement agencies. This would be based on reasonable 
belief that the dwelling or that part filmed was being used 
for work or business, or that the accused reasonably 
believed that the surveillance was necessary to protect 
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individual or public health or safety, or to provide evidence 
of a crime, - and the extent of surveillance was necessary 
for those purposes. The Commission is of the view that such 
defences will protect the media. 
iii. The Harassment Act 1997 was passed to deal with gangs and 
domestic and other stalking behaviour. Harassment can only 
be criminal if there is an intention to create fear for the 
victim’s safety or for that of the victim’s family.  However, 
civil restraining orders can be obtained more easily, where 
there is distress caused by specified behaviours, such as 
watching and loitering near the home or work of the victim, 
or following or accosting them. Such acts have to be part of 
a pattern of behaviour which includes the act on at least two 
separate occasions within a 12 month period. There is a 
defence of lawful purpose.  
iv. The Law Commission has recommended that the Act be 
amended to make clear that filming people, tracking their 
movements and tapping telephone calls can amount to 
harassment ie: keeping people under surveillance. Further a 
single protracted act of surveillance could trigger the Act, 
rather than two separate incidences.  
The Commission had quite a bit to say about the defence of 
lawful purpose. They suggest it would clearly cover media 
using a hidden camera to obtain information of real public 
concern where there is no other effective method of 
obtaining it.  However, they point out that the defence does 
not cover extreme forms of harassment, by surveillance or 
otherwise. The activity must be proportionate to the 
purpose. Acts lawful in themselves may invite a restraining 
order where the manner of performance creates actual 
harassment. So just having a lawful purpose is not enough.  
The United Kingdom Harassment Act has been applied to 
paparazzi activities, but the defence there requires that the 
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conduct be reasonable, not just proportionate, in the 
circumstances.  
The Law Commission has indicated that the defence in New 
Zealand could be made clearer to indicate the requirement 
of proportionality, but that the Bill of Rights would still have 
to be taken into account in that process. 
So, Alison Mau has a number of choices, all really depending on the context of 
the ‘stalking’ she says she has been experiencing. Meanwhile, the government is 
to consider the Law Commission’s recommendations when it completes its review 
of the law, later in the year. 
 
Ursula Cheer 
